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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: 
An Analysis of Its Impact and Future 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When Congress amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 19341 by enact-
ing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA),2 American business was 
uncertain about predicting the effects of the new legislation.3 The FCP A con-
tains two major provisions: an internal accounting requirement4 and anti bribery 
provisions.5 The former provision requires every issuer of securities to keep 
accurate records which fairly reflect disposition of assets and to devise a system 
of internal accounting control to regulate the disposition and recording of 
assets. 6 The latter provisions prohibit issuers from offering or paying anything 
of value to a foreign official to influence him to make any act or to use his 
infl uence to affect any government act in order to obtain or retain business. 7 The 
antibribery provisions received widespread publicity.s Critics speculated about 
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). The securities laws include the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Act of 1934, the Public Holding Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940. The 1933 Act's main objective was the disclosure of information, whereas, the 
1934 Act's main thrust was to prevent fraud. Generally, the 1934 Act regulated the securities market 
and the dealer-brokers. For a general overview of the 1934 Act see W. CAREY & M. EISENBERG, 
CoRPORATIONS 26&-76 (5th ed. 1980). 
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pob. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104,91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. I 1977». The Senate and House passed the 
legislation on December 6 and 7, 1977, respectively. President Carter signed the bill into law on 
December 19, 1977. 
3. See genemUy Landauer, Antibribery Law Uncertainties Persist, Wall St. j., May 30, 1979, at 12, col. 2; 
Taubman, U.S. Seen ClarifYing Bribery Law, N.Y. Times, May 29, 1979, at Dl, col. 3; Buckley, Warning: 
Quagmire Ahead, 28 NAT'L REv. 583 (May 28, 1976); The Double Damn, TIME, June 28, 1976, at 58; Eliot 
Richardson On Bribery, NEW REpUBLIC, July 24, 1976, at 3; Everybody's Doing It?, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Mar. 
24, 1976, at 278; Sorenson, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives and Proposals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 719 
(1976); Coping With the New Rules of Conduct, Bus. WK., Oct. 10, 1977, at 76; U.S. MtnJeS to Ban Overseas 
Payments, AviATION WK., June 6, 1977, at 197; Antibribery Bill Backfires, Bus. WK., Apr. 17, 1978, at 148; 
Estey & Marston, Pitfalls (and Looplwles) in the Foreign Bribery Law, FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 1978, at 182; 
Richman, Stopping Payments Under the Table, Bus. WK., May 22, 1978, at 18; Foreign Bribes, TIME, Nov. 
26, 1979, at 61; Misinterpreting the Antibribery Law, Bus. WK., Sept. 3, 1979, at 150. 
4. FCPA, § 102. Section 102 amends § 13(b) of the 1934 Act. 
5. Id. §§ 103-104. Section 103 amends § 30 of the 1934 Act by adding § 30A entitled "Foreign 
Corrupt Practices By Issuers." Section 104 of the FCPA is entitled "Foreign Corrupt Practices By 
Domestic Concerns"; it applies to domestic 'concerns other than an issuer subject to § 30A of the 1934 
Act. Sections 103 and 104 are nearly identical in their prohibitory language. 
6. Id. § 102. 
7. [d. § 103. 
8. See note 3 supra. 
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provisions of the Act which failed to adequately define crucial terms such as 
"corruptly,"9 "obtaining or retaining business,"lo "foreign official,"11 and 
"facilitating"12 payments. 13 Furthermore, opponents of the law felt that these 
antibribery provisions might have debilitating effects on the ability of American 
businesses to compete in world markets. 14 In response to these concerns, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) solicited comments from any in-
terested party on the impact of the FCP A 15 and "any impediments which it 
presents to legitimate foreign commerce."16 The SEC received an insufficient 
response from this request to draw any meaningful conclusions about the poten-
tial impact of the new law.17 
While the lack of raw data hampers efforts to make an accurate assessment of 
the FCPA,1B one may draw preliminary conclusions about the Act's impact by 
examining recent litigation, and the rules promulgated by the SEC. 19 In addi-
tion, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the General Account-
ing Office of the United States (GAO) have conducted empirical studies of the 
9. FCPA. §§ 103-104. 
10.Id. 
II. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Impact of the Antibribery Prohibitions. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,574, 12,576 (1980). 
14. Id. See generally Foreign Corrupt Pr(J£tice> Act, Hearing Before tlu! Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. I (1979); Best, The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 11 REV. SEC. REG. 975 (1978). 
15. Impact of the Antibribery Prohibitions, 45 Fed. Reg. at 12,574, 12,576 (1980). 
16.Id. 
17. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001 (1980). Despite provisions for 
the confidential submission of information, only fourteen letters were received during the request 
period. /d. at 59,004. Commenting on the limited response it received, the Commission stated, "[0 If 
these fourteen letters, one transmitted a duplicate copy of a trade associate's comments and another 
took issue with a decision of a different independent regulatory agency, which was unrelated to Section 
30A." Id. The Commission noted that while the data was insufficient to formulate any definite conclu-
sions about the impact of the FCPA, the limited response seemed incongruent with concerns expressed 
in publications. /d. See note 3 supra. 
18. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001 (1980). 
19. The SEC has stated: 
[Tlhere is presently no ... body of empirical data that would support such analysis of the 
impact and operation of the bribery prohibitions of Section 30A .... the available data is 
insufficient to support a reasoned evaluation of whether problems exist that were not contem-
plated at the time the FCPA was enacted, what alternatives may be appropriate for dealing with 
these problems, and the degree to which alternative responses may be consistent with the 
multiple objectives that the Congress sought to achieve by enacting the FCPA. 
Id. at 59,004. 
The General Accounting Office has completed an empirical study of the FCPA. It was based on a 250 
company sample selected from Fortune's top 1000. The study used the questionnaire method of data 
collection and attempted to insure accurate responses using audit techniques. Id. See COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE FOREICro.: CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 01\' U.S. BUSINESS 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT ON U.S. BUSINEssl. Another body of information will also be 
available when the Department of Justice evaluates the results of its FCPA Review Procedure. Commis-
sion Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. at 59,004-05 (1980). 
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FCPA.20 This Comment will analyze the current interpretation of the Act by 
tracing the development of the FCPA. Since corporations continue to bear the 
burden of understanding and complying with the FCPA,21 management must be 
careful and responsible in order to avoid the FCPA's severe sanctions22 while 
continuing to compete vigorously in world markets. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE ACT 
The Watergate scandal heightened the public's sense of political morality and 
raised concerns about high level corruption in both the public and private 
sectors. The FCPA was born in this morality oriented post-Watergate atmo-
sphere. 23 The SEC investigated illegal domestic political payments and learned 
that many corporations used secret funds to conceal questionable payments to 
foreign government officials. 24 In addition, the publicity generated by these 
20. See H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY MORE THAN THREE YEARS UNDER 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1981) [hereinafter cited as WEISBERG & REICHENBERG], for a 
research report on the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's study. This report details the accounts of U.S. 
firms who have had difficulty complying with the FCPA and is based on 180 responses from both 
domestic and foreign-based firms.ld. at I & n.l. See also IMPACT 0" U.S. BUSI"ESS, supra note 19, for the 
results of the GAO study. 
21. Warner, SEC Head Tries to Allay Corporate Fears About Antibribery Record-Keeping Rules, Wall St. J., 
Jan. 14, 1981, at 14, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Warner). Harold Williams, a former chairman of the 
SEC, has stated that the SEC holds management responsible for engendering corporate integrity. He 
has suggested that placing "the regulatory burden on companies and on the auditing profession -
through independent directors and audit committees - is in keeping with ... [President) Reagan's 
philosophy that emphasizes self-regulation rather than extensive government intervention in com-
panies' internal affairs." Id. 
22. Violations of the FCPA can result in a maximum fine of $1 million for a corporation, provided 
the corporation is a domestic concern or registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. FCPA, 
§§ 103-104. In addition, any officer, director, shareholder or agent acting on the corporation's behalf is 
personally subject to a maximum $10,000 fine and five year prison sentence. Id. 
23. Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J. 293, 
293 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Surrey). Walter Surrey suggests that Congress has attempted, using the 
FCPA as a vehicle, to apply domestic standards of morality in an inappropriate context.Id. This thesis 
that the United States should unilaterally regulate its international business practices is certainly open to 
debate and is at the root of the philosophical disagreement over the FCPA. See Carter, Foreign Policy 
Bwed on America', E.lSenlial Character, 76 DEP'T STATE Bul.l.. 621-25 (1977). 
24. WEISBERG & REICHE"BERG, supm note 29, at 4; Surrey, supa note 23, at 293-94. Lockheed paid 
$22 million in bribes to foreign governments. Lockheed Says It Will Resist SEC Efforts to Block It From 
Paying Bribe.1 Abload, Wall SI. J., Aug. 6, 1975, at 8, col. I. Five hundred and twenty-seven corporations 
admitted having made substantial questionable payments to foreign officials. These corporations 
included Exxon which gave $59.4 million, Boeing which gave $50.4 million, and Northrup which gave 
$34.3 million. Bll.Iine.I.1 Without Bribes, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 19, 1979, at 63. See SENATE COMM. 0" BANKING, 
HOU"NG A"D URBA" AFFAIRS, 94TH Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT 0" QUESTIO"ABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE 
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) (this report was submitted to the Committee by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
Because of these disclosures several executive officers of large corporations resigned, including Gulf 
Oil Corporation executives, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1976, at I, col. 2, and Lockheed Corporation 
executives, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1976, at I, col. 5. 
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payments hampered the ability of the United States to conduct an effective 
foreign policy.25 The SEC and the Department of Justice, therefore, attempted 
to convince U.S. corporations to regulate themselves voluntarily.26 
In 1976, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs held 
hearings on questionable payments to foreign governmental officials.27 The SEC 
presented the Committee with a summary of its findings on the subject in a 
report entitled, "Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Ques-
tionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices."28 The report detailed 
the questionable payments made by eighty-nine U.S. firms.29 The motive behind 
many of these payments, according to the report, was to generate goodwill with 
and prevent governmental interference from foreign nations in which the cor-
porations held assets.30 
Although Congress recognized the existence of a problem with corrupt for-
eign practices of U.S. corporations, Congress could not uniformly suggest a 
remedy. Congress debated whether it should criminalize questionable corporate 
payments, or merely establish a system of reporting and disclosure.3! The De-
partment of State supported the latter approach because it did not involve the 
25. Congressman John M. Murphy commented: 
Recently, through corporate public disclosure, we have become acutely aware of the dimen-
sions of the foreign bribery problem and its deleterious effect on V.S. foreign policy, on the 
business climate abroad for V.S. c"'Porations, and on our own moral expectations. Payments 
by Lockheed alone, have had some very significant, and in some cases, perhaps irreversible, 
adverse political effects in Italy, Japan and the Netherlands. 
The Foreign Bribery Bill would require corporations to adhere to certain accounting 
standards and would make it a crime to falsify company books and records or to deceive an 
accountant in connection with his audit. Moreover, it would apply criminal penalties to 
companies which bribe foreign officials. Significantly, most corporations favor the bill since it 
would make it easier to resist pressure from foreign officials, and since many of the bribes 
disclosed to date have involved one V.S. concern competing with another V.S. concern for the 
same business. 
Address by Congressman John M. Murphy before the National Securities Traders Association (Oct. 17, 
1976), cited in Primoff, Intemalronal Regulalron of Multinational C01poratrons and Business - TIu! United 
Nalions Takes Aim, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 287, 315 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Primoff]. 
26. Id. at 294. The Justice Department and the SEC did not have enough personnel or the jurisdic-
tion necessary to investigate foreign activities of V.S. corporations. Id. Kane & Butler, Improper Corporate 
Pa),menl.I: TIu! Second Half of Wale/gale, 8 Loy. V. CHI. L.J. I, 37-38 (1976); McManis, Questionable 
Paymenls Abmad: An Anlill'usl Appmach, 86 YALE L. J. 215, 228 (1976). 
27. WEISBERG & REICHENBERG, supra note 20, at 4. 
28. Report of tlu! Securities and Exchange Commissron on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and 
Praclices 10 1Iu! Senale Comm. on Banking, HOtLSing and Urban Affairs (May 12, 1976) reprinted in [1976] SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 353 (Special Supplement) 1 [hereinafter cited as SEC Reporl]. The SEC 
prepared this report in response to a resquest by Sen. Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking 
Committee. 
29.Id. 
30. Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crises: TIu! OVlJrseas Paymem Problem, 8 LAw & PoL'v INT'L Bus. 547, 
564 (1976). 
31. Atkeson, TIu! Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An International Application of SEC's Corporate 
Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAw. 703, 704 (1980). 
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imposItIOn of U.S. standards on other countries. 32 This position reflects the 
common notion in international law that the host country should be responsible 
for regulating conduct within its borders and the home country, i.e., the United 
States, should only be concerned with insuring that its nationals receive fair and 
equal treatment. 33 
Congress finally chose the criminalization approach over mere disclosure. 
Since the disclosure requirement would have implied that bribery was permissi-
ble as long as the corporation properly reported it,34 the criminalization of 
corporate payments provided a greater deterrent to bribery.35 The choice of 
criminalization does not entail a more burdensome prosecution, since the ele-
ments of proof in bribery prosecution are similar to those in a disclosure prose-
cution.36 This approach is unique to the United States; other nations with civil 
law systems do not impose criminal sanctions upon corporations. 37 
In enacting the FCPA, Congress had to choose between a system which 
criminalized questionable corporate payments and a system which merely re-
quired disclosure of the payments. The Carter Administration eventually sup-
ported legislation requiring disclosure, criminal sanctions and codes of conduct 
for U.S. corporate activities overseas. 38 However, the FCP A has been criticized as 
the type of legislative product which occurs when "the White House reverses 
signals at the last minute and when members of Congress, the administration, 
and the business community are unwilling to challenge a draft law for fear of 
being accused of being in favor of that which the law seeks to prohibit."39 
III. THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: DESCRIPTION OF SUBSTANTIVE 
PROVISIONS 
The FCP A has two substantive requirements. 4o Section 102 embodies the first 
provision which is designed to increase corporate accountability in disposition of 
32. Mark B. Feldman, the Deputy Legal Advisor to the Department of State, stated that "it would be 
not only presumptuous but counterproductive to seek to impose our specific standards in countries with 
differing histories and cultures." The Activities of A 17U!rUan Multinational Clffporations AlYroad: Hearings 
Bejlffe the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975). 
33. A State may treat its citizens "according to discretion." I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 682 
(H. Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955). Whether there is an international minimum standard of justice in 
international law is debatable. 
34. Comment, The Criminalization of American Extraterritorial Bribery: The Effect of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, 13 INT'L L. & POL. 645, 649 (1981) [hereinafter Criminalization of A17U!rican Bribery]. 
35.Id. 
36.Id. 
37. Id. at 650. 
38. Surrey, supra note 23, at 296-97. 
39. Id. at 296. Surrey described the FCPA as "not polished legislation" in a bit of scholarly under-
statement. !d. 
40. The accounting provisions are in § 102 and the antibribery provisions are in §§ 103 and 104. 
FCPA, §§ 102-104. 
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corporate assets and to aid the SEC in enforcing the FCPA.41 Section 102 
requires corporations to keep records, books and accounts which accurately 
reflect the disposition of corporate assets.42 These records must be kept "in 
reasonable detail."43 In addition, Section 102 requires corporations to maintain a 
system of internal accounting control to insure that all transactions have man-
agement's authorization, all transactions are recorded as necessary to maintain 
accurate records, access to assets is limited to those with authorization, and that 
at regular intervals recorded assets are compared to existing assets.44 A corpora-
tion which complies with Section 102 would find it difficult to avoid detection of 
misused corporate assets, especially funds used in questionable foreign pay-
ments.45 
The second substantive provision is contained in Sections 103 and 104 which 
make bribery of foreign officials a criminal offense.46 Section 103 applies to 
issuers under SEC jurisdiction47 and Section 104 applies to all other domestic 
concerns.48 The two sections, which are almost identical, define the scope of 
prohibited payments and the sanctions for violations.49 
A. Section 102: Accounting Standards 
The accounting provisions embodied in Section 102 require those subject to 
coverage of the Act to: 
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reason-
able detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of the assets of the issuer; and 
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that 
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's 
general or specific authorization; 
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such 
statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets; 
41. S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7,reprintl!d in [1977] U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4098, 
4104-05. 
42. FCPA, § 102. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 27 KAN. L. REv. 635, 641 (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as Comment]. 
46. FCPA, §§ 103-104. 
47. [d. § 103. 
48. [d. § 104. 
49. [d. §§ 103-104. 
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(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization; and 
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences. 5o 
411 
The legislative history 51 of the FCP A suggests that Congress considered ques-
tionable foreign payments as being closely related to inadequate corporate ac-
countability and a lack of accurate record keeping. 52 
Prior to enactment of the FCP A, the SEC expressed interest in strengthening 
corporate accountability under the SEC's rule-making authority.53 In a report54 
to Congress in 1976, the SEC stated that the "most devastating disclosure that we 
have uncovered ... has been the fact that, and extent to which, some companies 
have falsified entries in their uwn books and records."55 Congress intended that 
Section 1 02 address that deficiency. 56 
The accounting requirements seem reasonable on their face. As one commen-
tator has noted, Section 102 "appears only to require management to do that 
which would be dictated by ordinary business prudence; namely, keep books, 
records and accounts that are accurate and fair."57 The requirement for accurate 
bookkeeping makes it difficult for corporations to maintain unaccounted funds 
from which to dispense questionable payments. 
50. Id. § 102. 
51. For a synopsis of the history and origins of the Act, see Goelzer, The Accounting Provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - The Federalization of Corporate Recordkeeping and Internal Control, 5 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 6-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Goelzer]. 
52. Id. at 19. 
53. Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, 42 Fed. Reg. 4854,4856 (1977). Like many 
modern administrative agencies the SEC has broad rule making authority. Section 23(a)( 1) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 grants the Commission the authority to "make such rules and 
regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this title .... " Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 23(a)(I), 15 U.s.C. § 78 (w)(a)(l) (1976). While the Commission must consider 
the impact of such rules upon competition, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld "the validity of a 
regulation ... so long as it is reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation." Mourning v. 
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356,369 (1973), (quoting Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 
393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969». 
54. SEC Repo,t, supra note 28, at 1. 
55. Id. at 13. 
56. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 4. 
57. Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 57 HARv. Bus. REv. 32,33 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Baruch]. Mr. Baruch was special counsel to the SEC from 1969 to 1972. He stated that accuracy and 
fairness would be in the eye of the beholder, and in this case that would be the SEC. As a result the 
legislation was criticized by corporate lawyers and accounts. [d. This is consistent with the criticism 
which Doug Carmichael, vice president of the American Institute of Certified Public Accounts: "Any 
institution depending on the benevolence of those in charge will always have cause to worry." Warner, 
,upra note 21. 
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1. The Requirement of Accurate Records 
The legislative history of Section 102 indicates that congressional debate 
focused on the inclusion of the word "accurately" in subsection A.58 The account-
ing profession felt that the standard would be impossible to satisfy due to the 
inexact nature of accounting. 59 The original House bill contained no provision 
for fair and accurate record keeping as did the comparable section of the Senate 
bil1. 60 The Conference Committee adopted the Senate bill's requirement of 
"accurately and fairly" keeping records, but qualified the provision with the 
words "in reasonable detail."61 The Conference Report stated: 
The conference committee adopted the "in reasonable detail" qual-
ification to the accurate and fair requirement in light of concern that 
such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a degree of exactitude 
and precision which is unrealistic. The amendment makes clear that 
the issuer's records should reflect transactions in conformity with 
accepted methods of recording economic events and effectively pre-
vent off-the-books slush funds and payments of bribes.62 
The Conference Report indicates that congressional intent was not to condone 
minor mistakes but merely to insure that corporations were not required to meet 
a level of precision beyond the capabilities of modern accounting methods. 63 
There was an attempt, during the congressional deliberations, to add a "mate-
riality" requirement to the "accuracy" requirement.64 Under such a standard, 
much of the effect of the accuracy requirement would have been lost. 65 For 
example, the standard of materiality would have added an additional element of 
proof in an enforcement proceeding which may have been difficult to prove. 
The suggestion for a materiality test did not prevail, and the only congressional 
qualification is that the records be kept "in reasonable detail."66 
a. Records 
Under the FCPA, records are not limited to financial statements required by 
the Securities Exchange Act.67 The definition of records contained in the securi-
58. FCPA, § 102. See Baruch, ,upm note 57, at 33. 
59. Baruch, supra note 57, at 33. 
60. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Congo 1st Sess. 10reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4121, 
4122. 
61. [d. 
62. /d. 
63. Goelzer, supra note 57, at 23. 
64. [d. at 22. 
65. [d. 
66. FCPA, § 102; Goelzer, supra note 51, at 22-23; H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4121, 4122. 
67. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 23-24. 
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ties laws includes: "accounts, correspondence, memorandums, tapes, discs, pa-
pers, books, and other documents or transcribed information of any type, 
whether expressed in ordinary or machine language."68 The implication of this 
definition is that the scope of the accuracy requirement extends beyond those 
records which are used to prepare financial statements, or those records which 
are part of the accounting system.69 As one authority has noted: "Congress's use 
of the term 'records' suggests that virtually any tangible embodiment of informa-
tion made or kept by an issuer is within the scope of section 102 ... at least if it 
pertains to the recording of 'economic events.' "70 
b. Scienter 
The original Senate bill prohibited any person from "knowingly" falsifying 
accounting records.71 The House bill had no similar provision.72 In conference, 
the Senate deferred to the House73 which was concerned that the legislation 
would be a vehicle for congressional debate on the Supreme Court decision in 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder. 74 Application of the "knowingly" standard might 
have the effect of expanding or overruling the decision. 75 In Hochfelder, the 
Court held that negligence by an auditing firm was not sufficient to make.the 
firm liable to a shareholder under SEC Rule 1 Ob-5. 76 Although the decision was 
based upon an SEC rule distinct from the sections of the 1934 Act which were 
amended by the FCPA,77 and the Committee Report on S.305 (the Senate 
version of the FCPA) made it clear that the "knowingly" provisions were severa-
ble from other securities law,78 the Conference Committee, nevertheless, con-
cluded that the safest method to avoid raising the issue was to delete the 
provision entirely.79 This deletion was not intended to hinder the SEC's ability to 
adopt a similar provision through its rule-making powers.80 
An accounting provision violation does not depend on any criminal motive by 
68. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(37) (1976). 
69. Goelzer. supra note 51, at 23. 
70. Id. at 23-24. 
71. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., lst Sess. 10. reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
4121,4123. 
72.Id. 
73.Id. 
74. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
75. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong .• 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
4121,4123. 
76. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
77.Id. 
78. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1O-11,reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
4121. 4123. 
79. Id. at 10. 
80. /d. at 11. Indeed the SEC had already published similar rules for comment under existing 
authority.ld. at 10. See note 48 and accompanying text supra. 
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the issuer.81 Thus, enforcement agencies are not required to prove the issuer 
possessed any criminal intent to establish a violation of the FCPA; proving 
criminal intent would, in most cases, be extremely difficult.82 The SEC has taken 
this position by stating that "the language of new section 13(b)(2)(A) ... contains 
no words indicating Congress intended to impose a 'scienter' requirement."83 
2. Internal Controls 
Also included under the accounting provisions is the requirement that every 
SEC-reporting com pany establish a system of internal accounting controls.84 The 
system must provide reasonable assurances that: 
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's 
general or specific authorization; 
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary ... to permit prepara-
tion of financial statements . . . and to maintain accountability for 
assets; 
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with man-
agement's general or specific authorization; and 
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals· and appropriate action is taken 
with respect to any differences.85 
This record keeping provision applies regardless of the specific dollar amount or 
materiality of the transaction.86 According to legislative history, Congress ex-
pected corporations to use cost-benefit analysis to determine an appropriate 
accounting system.87 The appropriate internal accounting system depends on 
"the size of the business, diversity of operations, degree of. centralization of 
financial and operating management, and the amount of contact by top man-
agement with day-to-day operations."88 A company which has absolutely no 
system for regulating certain types of transactions might be held to have violated 
the internal control provision.89 These transactions would include "the transfer 
of funds outside the country or the making of political contributions."9o 
81. Goelzer,supra note 51, at 24. See also H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 
[1977] U.S. CODE CO"G. & AD. NEWS 4121, 4123. 
82. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 24. 
83. [1979] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 491, at H-7 (Feb. 21, 1979). 
84. FCPA, § 102. 
85. [d. 
86. Baruch, supra note 57, at 38. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. 
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a. Proposed Rules 
In the spring of 1979, the SEC proposed several rules which would have 
required corporations subject to the FCPA to "provide information about the 
effectiveness of systems of internal accounting control."91 The proposed rules 
would have required a statement by the management of these corporations on 
the adopted method of their internal accounting controls.92 Management would 
have included this statement as part of its annual report filed with the SEC as 
well as in the annual report given to its security holders.93 The proposed rules 
would require an independent accountant to examine the management's state-
ment; management would be required to include the accountant's findings in the 
annual reports.94 In addition, the management's statement would include the 
following: 95 
l. Management's opinion as to whether, as of the date of such 
audited balance sheet, the systems of internal accounting control of 
the registrant and its subsidiaries provided reasonable assurances 
that specified objectives of internal accounting control were 
achieved; and 
2. A description of any material weakness in internal accounting 
control communicated by the independent accountants of the regis-
trant or its subsidiaries which have not been corrected, and a state-
ment of the reasons why they have not been corrected.96 
The SEC did not suggest any specific control procedures since it believed that 
"those provisions must be determined in the context of the circumstances of each 
issuer."97 According to the SEC, the corporation would continue to assume 
responsibility for making those determinations.98 The purpose behind the exam-
ination of the statement by the independent accountant was to increase the 
reliability of the management's statement. 99 The SEC recognized that the "inde-
pendent accountant's responsibility will be more limited than that of manage-
ment."loo Therefore, management would be primarily responsible for the state-
ment. 
In discussing the additional costs that the proposed rules would cause corpora-
tions to incur, the SEC suggested that: 
91. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,702 (1979). 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. 
95. /d. This requirement only applied to periods after December 15, 1980. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 26,703. 
98. /d. See note 20 supra. 
99. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,702, 26,703 (l979). 
100. [d. 
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costs likely would be in large part of an initial rather than a 
continuing nature .... [I]n many instances the additional work of the 
independent accountant with respect to internal accounting control 
would result in reductions in costs of the financial statements, as 
independent accountants would be able to place more reliance on 
internal accounting control. ... [T]he additional costs of the pro-
posed requirement that the statement of management on internal 
accounting control be examined by an independent public accoun-
tant would be outweighed by the increased reliability of the state-
ment of management which would result from such examination. lol 
b. Withdrawal of Proposed Rules 
The SEC's optimism concerning the cost analysis was apparently not widely 
shared, as the proposed rules met with strong opposition.l02 The objections to 
the proposed rules centered on the cost of complying with the rules, the possibil-
ity of SEC preemption of significant voluntary initiatives already undertaken by 
private industry and the view that the required management statement was more 
of a tool to gauge compliance with the law than a source of useful information to 
investors. l03 The SEC, without disputing all the opposing claims, withdrew the 
proposed rules in order "to allow existing voluntary and private-sector initiatives 
for public reporting on internal accounting control - by both registrants and 
accountants - to continue to develop."104 The SEC has since adopted the policy 
of monitoring the voluntary initiatives of corporations such as "[m]anagement 
statements on internal accounting controls; [c]omprehensive management re-
ports in general; and [p]ublic reporting by independent accountants on internal 
accounting control." 105 
3. Scope of the Accounting Provisions 
The accounting requirements of the FCPA are expansive in the scope of their 
coverage. Section 102106 covers "every issuer which has a class of securities 
registered pursuant to section 12 of this title and every issuer which is required 
to file reports pursuant to section 15(d)."107 An issuer is "any person who issues 
or proposes to issue any security."loB Section 102 applies to registered foreign 
issuers; however, enforcement against such corporations may be problematic 
101. Id. at 26,708. 
102. Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 40,134,40,135 (1980). 
103. /d. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. FCPA, § 102. This is amended Section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act. 
107. /d. 
108. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(8), 15 U.s.C. § 78(c)(a)(8) (1976). 
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because of "differences in accounting methods and auditing techniques, foreign 
financial privacy laws, delicate questions of foreign sovereignty and diplomacy, 
and the practical and legal limits of the Commission's investigatory and en-
forcement authority."I09 
a. Foreign Subsidiaries 
Some commentators note that the FCPA does not apply directly to foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. corportions. l1O One may read Section 102 to mean that 
unless the subsidiary were a registrant of the SEC, it would not be an issuer as 
defined by the FCPA.111 However, the FCPA's legislative history demonstrates 
that Congress did not intend such a literal and narrow interpretation.112 The 
anti bribery provisions apply only to "domestic concerns,"113 and issuers which 
have securities registered with or are required to file reports with the SEC.114 
The FCPA defines a domestic concern as any individual who is a 
citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or ... any corpora-
tions, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship, which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized 
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, posses-
sion, or commonwealth of the United States.1I5 
This definition excludes foreign subsidiaries because Congress recognized "the 
inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the 
inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of 
the bill."116 The Conference Report emphasizes, however, that any issuer or 
domestic concern which bribes foreign officials indirectly, through foreign sub-
sidiaries or any other entity, would itself be liable under the FCP A. 117 
The parent corporation based in the United States is responsible for the 
accounting system of its foreign subsidiaries,us The accounting provisions 
would be rendered ineffective if a corporation could avoid the requirement for 
accurate records and accounting by tolerating a subsidiary's accounting 
abuses. 119 One authority has suggested that management can safely act only by 
109. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 20-21. 
110. Comment, supra note 45, at 640-41. 
Ill. FCPA, § 102. 
112. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 21. 
113. FCPA, § 104. 
114. [d. § 103. 
115. [d. § 104. 
116. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CO'JE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
4121,4126. 
117. [d. 
118. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 21. 
119. [d. 
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assuming that the accounting provisions of the FCPA fully apply to all foreign 
subsidiaries. 120 He defends this premise by stating: 
First, where the books and records of a subsidiary are materially 
deficient in a financial sense, the books and records of the parent 
company may well be inaccurate insofar as they reflect consolidating 
entries (or pick up an equity interest in a nonconsolidated sub-
sidiary). In such cases, the SEC could choose to bring an enforce-
ment action against the parent company under the act's record-
keeping provision. 
Second, where management of the parent company is engaged in 
corrupt or improper practices through a subsidiary whose books and 
records are deficient, the obvious remedy would be to bring an 
action against the parent company under the disclosure provisions of 
the federal securities laws. 
Third, where the management of the parent company knew, or 
had reason to know, that the subsidiary was engaged in foreign 
corrupt practices, which the act would prohibit if done by the parent, 
the SEC might charge the parent with failing to disclose the prac-
tices. 121 
b. Reasonahle Assurance 
The system of internal accounting controls is to be judged by a "reasonable 
assurance" standard;122 it must be "sufficient to provide reasonable assurance" 
that certain safeguards are met. 123 The incorporation of the "reasonable assur-
ance" standard in the statute indicates that Congress was aware of the costs 
associated with many of these controls. One writer has suggested that "the 
development of the initial accounting system required by the Act can cost as 
much as fifty thousand dollars, [and] many corporate officials and attorneys 
complain that the accounting standards ... impose an onerous burden, particu-
larly on small corporations."124 Another writer has suggested that there would be 
widespread noncompliance with the internal accounting provisions among 
smaller businesses because of the costs involved.125 If the marginal costs of 
implementing further internal controls outweigh the marginal utility derived 
from the controls, one may expect a corporation to eschew the economically 
unjustified controls. 126 
120. Baruch, supra note 57, at 38. 
121. Id. 
122. FCPA, § 102. 
123. /d. 
124. Comment, supra note 45, at 642. 
125. /d. 
126. Baruch, supra note 57, at 38. 
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Under the cost-benefit analysis suggested in the "reasonable assurances" stan-
dard, fears of overly burdensome compliance costs are ungrounded. As the 
Senate Report on S. 3664 (a predecessor of S. 305) stated that the internal 
accounting provision is not "intended to be enforced to the point at which the 
costs associated with a particular corporate system of internal accounting con-
trols exceeds the benefits that flow from that system. The accounting profession 
will be expected to use their professional judgment in evaluating the systems 
maintained by issuers."127 
One caveat to this general rule is that strict economic cost-benefit analysis 
might not apply for certain types of abuses such as bribery. The history of the 
FCPA was "unusually sensitive"128 to the issue of foreign bribery. Thus, a 
corporation's failure to implement safeguards to protect assets worth less than 
the costs of the controls may violate the FCP A if the transaction involves "foreign 
bribery or other facets of the integrity of management."129 The accounting 
requirement mandates that the transaction be properly and accurately recorded, 
and that all other information be listed which would lead a reviewer to possible 
illegal activity.130 This requirement can be problematic for the management of a 
corporation engaged in foreign bribery. To comply with the record keeping 
provision, a corporation would have to submit incriminating reports to the SEC; 
"if a company is buying its business by commercial bribery, the SEC may take the 
position that its records are not accurate and fair unless it has labeled such 
disbursements as 'bribes to secure business.' "131 Therefore, the cost-benefit 
analysis may not be appropriate in the areas where the accounting system is 
designed to prevent bribery. 
B. Sections 103 and 104: Antibribery Provisions 
The second set of substantive provisions of the FCPA is that which criminalizes 
bribery. Section 103132 prohibits the "payment of any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to ... any 
foreign official for the purposes of ... influencing any act or decision of such 
official in his official capacity."133 A foreign official is defined by this Section as 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, 
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official 
127. S. Rep. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 
) 28. American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New 
Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securiti2s Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus. L. 307, 319 (1978). 
129. Goelzer. supra note 51. at 29. 
130. Baruch, sujlra note 57, at 34. 
131. Id. 
132. FCPA, § 102. 
133. ld. 
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capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality .... [The definition] does not include any em-
ployer of a foreign government ... whose duties are essentially 
ministerial or c1erical.134 
1. Scope of the FCPA Antibribery Provisions 
Congress limited the reach of the FCP A anti bribery provisions by excluding 
from the Act's coverage payments to clerical government workers of foreign 
nations. In so doing, Congress intended to permit so-called "grease" pay-
ments. 135 These facilitating payments are common and culturally accepted in 
some nations,136 and help governmental clerks supplement their small govern-
ment salaries. 137 Typically, corporations will make facilitating payments in order 
to receive the permits and licenses necessary to conduct business in the country. 
By permitting facilitating payments, Congress has encouraged the anomalous 
result that a small payment to a government official to influence the decision-
making process would be illegal, while a much larger payment to a clerical 
official would not be illegaJ.138 The FCPA anticipates that possibility by requiring 
corporations to report large facilitating payments under the accounting provi-
sions of the FCPA.139 
2. The "Corruptly" and the "To Obtain Business" Requirements 
Under the FCPA antibribery provisions, payments are not illegal unless the 
corporation makes them "corruptly"140 and "to assist the issuer or domestic 
concern in obtaining or retaining business."141 The term "corruptly" means, 
according to the legislative history of the FCPA, "an evil motive or purpose, an 
intent to wrongfully influence the recipient."142 Congress' use of the word 
134. Id. 
135. H.R. Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
4121,4124-25. 
136. Comment, supra note 45, at 643. See generally Greene, Ethics Not Customs: Corporate Misconduct 
Alnoad, Vn. SPEECHES DAY, Oct. 15, 1975, at 25; Sherman, Foreign Payouts Defended as Necessary: 
Lockheed's Business Practices Abroad, AVIATION WEEKLY, Aug. II, 1975, at 21; Gwirtzman, Is Bribery 
Defensible1, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 19; Why Americans Pay Bribes to Do Business 
Abroad, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., June 2, 1975, at 57; Bribery: A Shocker in U.S., But a Tradition Overseas, 
U.S. NEWS & WORlD REp., Apr. 12, 1976, at 33. But see, Griffith, Payoff Is Not Accepted Practice, FORTUNE, 
Aug. 1975, at 22. 
137. Comment, supra note 45, at 643. 
138. Id.; Baruch, supra note 57, at 46. 
139. [1978] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 452, at A-4 (May 10, 1978). 
140. FCPA, §§ 103, 104. 
141. Id. 
142. S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CoDE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4098, 
4108. 
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"corruptly" indicates that the purpose of the payment must be to "induce the 
recipient to misuse his offical position."143 
Because of the requirement that payments be made "corruptly" before the 
transaction can be considered a violation of the FCP A, a corporation could 
conceivably make facilitating payments to officials as well as to clerical workers 
without violating the antibribery provisions of the ACt.144 One writer notes: 
A facilitating payment to a foreign official is intended merely to 
move a matter toward an eventual act or decision, it does not have 
the forbidden purpose of "inducing such foreign official to use his 
influence with a foreign government ... to affect or influence any act 
or decision of such government."145 
In an enforcement action, the enforcement agency must, therefore prove there 
was a corrupt purpose. However, even if no corrupt intent exists, the corpora-
tion still must properly account for its payment under the accounting provi-
sion.146 The anti bribery and accounting provisions are thus able to act in tandem 
in an enforcement action. 147 
The "obtaining or retaining business" standard is almost inconsequential in 
light of the SEC's broad interpretation of the phrase. 148 Payments for special. tax 
treatment, product promotion, and even for generation of goodwill are illegal 
under the SEC's expansive standard.149 Payments completely unrelated to ob-
taining or retaining business would be permissible; however, it is difficult to 
envision a situation where a corporation would be motivated to make such a 
non-business related payment. 
III. DEFENSES TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
A. Extortion 
In enacting the FCPA, Congress intended to give U.S. businessmen a cogent 
excuse for strongly resisting extortion attempts. 150 Whether businessmen, suc-
cumbing to extortion, would have a valid defense to an action brought under the 
FCPA is questionable. The Senate report on the legislation stated: 
The defense that the payment was demanded on the part of a 
government official as a price for gaining entry into a market or to 
143. [d. 
144. Baruch, supra note 57, at 46. 
145.Id. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. 
148. [1978] SEC. REG & L. REP. (BNA) No. 452, at A-4 (May 10, 1978). 
149. Comment, supra note 45, at 644. 
150. See Goelzer, supra note 51, at 6-19. 
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obtain a contract would not suffice since at some point the U.S. 
company would make a conscious decision whether or not to pay a 
bribe. That the payment may have been first proposed by the recipient 
rather than the U.S. company does not alter the corrupt purpose on 
the part of the person paying the bribe. On the other hand true 
extortion situations would not be covered by this provision since a 
payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being dynamited 
should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt pur-
poses. 151 
This explanation provides little guidance in determining whether the defense 
of extortion is available in a prosecution under the FCPA, however. The report 
indicates that a terrorist attack might provide the ground for the extortion 
defense, but does not address the more probable situation of a businessman 
faced with a reasonable threat, such as unfair favoritism of another corpora-
tion. 152 
One commentator has suggested that a business could resolve the extortion 
problem through consultations with the U.S. Embassy.153 This approach "might 
result in a diplomatic protest, which would remove the threat ... [or] if a 
payment was deemed necessary in light of irremediable corruption in the for-
eign government, it would help the company to document the bona fide nature 
of the threat, and thus avoid later prosecution."154 Corporations in facing extor-
tion should follow this advice. 
B. The "Knowing or Having Reason To Know" Requirement 
The FCPA prohibits corporations from making bribery payments indirectly.155 
The antibribery provisions make it illegal "to use an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, and so forth to any 
person while 'knowing or having reason to know' that all or any portion of such 
money will be offered or given to any prohibited recipient."156 The phrase 
"knowing or having reason to know" and its possible effects is controversial as 
the legislative history of the FCP A has no hint as to Congressional intent as to the 
meaning of the phrase. 157 The effect of that phrase and interpretation of its 
meaning is significant. For example, corporations could not evade the FCPA by 
passing money payments to an "agent" if circumstances suggested that the 
151. S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
4098,4108. 
152. Baruch, supra note 57, at 48. 
153. [d. 
154. [d. 
155. FCPA, §§ 103-104. 
156. Baruch, supra note 57, at 48. 
157.Id. 
1982] FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 423 
payments were being forwarded to foreign officials; SUSpiCIOUS circumstances 
would arise when the agent received disproportionate payment or rendered no 
services at all. '5S Therefore, corporations cannot avoid liability by passing the 
payment to an agent and later denying knowledge of the agent's activities. 159 
The language, "having reason to know,"'60 prevents corporations from using 
third parties to effect bribes and places a burden upon the corporation to 
supervise its agents. Some corporations have expressed concern over their 
ability to control an agent, who could, while acting ultra vires, cause a corporate 
violation of the FCPA.'6' A corporation must rely on agency law in formulating a 
defense to its agents' ultra vires violations of the FCPA,'62 and must be prepared 
to show it used reasonable care in supervising the activities of its agents. '63 
IV. ENFORCEMENT 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice both 
have enforcement and investigative responsibilities under the FCPA.'64 The 
Department of Justice prosecutes criminal violations of the FCPA,'65 and has 
exclusive authority to enforce, in either criminal or civil proceedings, Section 104 
of the FCPA. '66 The SEC, on the other hand, implements and civilly enforces 
Section 103 '67 as it does other sections of the Securities Exchange ACt. '6S 
A. The FCPA Review Procedure of the Department of Justice 
On March 20, 1980, the Department of Justice formed a Review Procedure 
through which companies can seek guidance on the legality of particular transac-
tions under the antibribery provisions of the FCPA.169 Under the Review Proce-
dure, after companies detail the particular transaction to the Department,170 the 
Department indicates whether it will take enforcement action. '71 Once the De-
158. Baruch, supra note 57. at 48. 
159. Comment, supra note 45, at 645. 
160. FCPA, §§ 103-104. 
161. Comment, supra note 45, at 645. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 646. 
165. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,003 (1980). 
166. /d. As of September, 1980, the SEC has filed one civil action seeking to enjoin violation of 
Section 30A and the Department of Justice has filed one criminal and two civil actions for alleged 
violation, of Section 30A. /d. 
167. FCPA, §§ 103-104. 
168. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,003 (1980); Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Review Procedure, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980). 
169. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,004 (1980). 
170. Id. 
171.1d. 
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partment receives all relevant information and the transaction is completed as 
described, it assures the companies that no enforcement action will commence 
until the Department gives prior clearance. 172 The Department makes every 
reasonable effort to respond to inquiries within 30 days.l73 Under the Review 
procedure, the Department will release no information to the public as long as 
the information is exempt from mandatory disclosure under the provisions of 
the Freedom of Information ACt. 174 However, the Department will make public 
releases of transactions described in general terms,175 giving companies a 
framework of guidance and predictability in the Department's enforcement 
actions. I 76 
B. The SEC's Response to the Review Procedure 
The SEC does not participate in the Department of Justice'S FCPA Review 
Procedure.177 Therefore, even after obtaining clearance from the Department 
of Justice, a company may face an SEC enforcement action. The SEC's rationale 
for non-participation in the Justice Department Review Procedure is that 
determinations with respect to the applicability of Section 30A to 
particular fact patterns often would turn on judgments concerning 
motivation and intent. ... [M]any questions of this nature do not 
easily lend themselves to guidance on the basis of a written descrip-
tion of a proposed transaction and that such questions could, in the 
first instance, be better resolved by corporate officials and their 
professional advisors, who have access to all of the relevant facts 
bearing upon intention. 178 
Although non-participation by the SEC reduces some of the effectiveness of the 
Department's FCP A Review Procedure,179 the SEC has stated that it would work 
closely with the Department of Justice in the administration of the antibribery 
provisions. 18o At the present time, the SEC and the Department of Justice do not 
interpret substantive provisions of the Act differently.181 The SEC has also stated 
that, as a general rule, it does not expect to bring any Section 30A (FCPA, 
172. [d. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. 
176. [d. 
177. [d. at 59,005. 
178. [d. at 59,004. 
179. The Department of Justice is not the sole enforcement agency of the FCPA; the SEC is also 
charged with enforcement. Comment, supra note 45, at 646. Thus, if a corporation gets clearance from 
the Department of Justice, the corporation may still be subject to an enforcement action by the SEC. 
180. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001, 59,005 (1980). 
181. [d. 
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Section 103) enforcement action where the Department of Justice has approved 
the transaction in a review request. 182 This expectation is important for corpora-
tions seeking guidelines, given that the Department of Justice may have consid-
erations in bringing a criminal action different from those that the SEC would 
make when deciding whether to bring a civil action.183 
In order to encourage use of the Department's Review Procedure, the SEC 
announced it would not, under its prosecutorial discretion, bring enforcement 
actions against those who properly cleared the transaction with the Depart-
ment.184 This policy applied to clearances obtained prior to May 31, 1981, and 
should allow a sufficient length of time to evaluate the efficacy of the review 
procedures. 185 
On November 12, 1981, the SEC announced that it intended to reinstate its 
policy with respect to the Justice Department's FCPA Review Procedure. 186 The 
SEC's policy automatically lapsed on May 31, 1981.187 Therefore, the SEC's 
policy is today, and remains until further notice, that the SEC will not as a matter 
of prosecutorial discretion take action under Section 30A (FCPA Section 103) 
where the issuer sought and received a letter from the Department of Justice 
stating that the Department would not commence criminal enforcement with 
respect to the transaction. 188 The SEC did not specify any evaluation it had made 
with respect to the Review Procedure other than a general reaffirmation of the 
intent to continue the "close working relationship with the Justice Department" 
which the SEC had maintained since the enactment of the FCPA.189 As of the 
date of the new policy statement, November 12, 1981, the Department of Justice 
had only issued four review letters pursuant to the FCPA Review Procedure. 19o 
All of them were issued prior to May 31, 1981.191 Corporations which have 
doubts about the applicability of the FCPA, and are in need of guidance, would 
be wise to fully utilize these Review Procedures. 
To date there have been few enforcement actions and convictions under the 
FCPA.192 The first FCPA suit under the accounting provisions to go to trial was 
in November 1981 in the U.S. District Court for Northern Georgia. 193 The suit 
182. [d. 
183. !d. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
186. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 629, at I-I (Nov. 18. 1981). 
187. [d. 
188. [d. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. 
19!. [d. 
192. Criminalization of American Bribery. supra note 34, 659-6l. 
193. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 628. at A-6 (Nov. II, 1981). 
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was the result of a complaint filed by the SEC alleging numerous violations of 
federal securities laws including the accounting provisions of the FCP A.194 The 
SEC described the bookkeeping as "sheer chaos."195 It also alleged that the 
principal shareholder of the corporation had reduced the assets of the company 
from $2 million to $500,000. 196 The SEC investigation began when the corpora-
tion's accountant refused to issue an opinion concerning the corporation's finan-
cial soundness and expressed concern over possible FCPA violations. 197 
One of the SEC's earliest enforcement actions under the accounting provision 
of the FCP A was Securities and Exchange Commission v. Page,198 in which the 
defendant allegedly dispensed $2.5 million to foreign officials in connection with 
the sale of aircraft. 199 The SEC claimed that the payments were made without 
adequate controls. 20o These controls would have insured that the payments were 
made for the recorded purpose; that the services, for which the payments were 
made, were actually rendered; and that the payments represented reasonable 
compensation for the services provided.201 Page demonstrates the relationship 
between the accounting provisions and the bribery prohibitions. 202 
In another enforcement action, the SEC charged that the defendant failed to 
maintain the accounting controls necessary to safeguard corporate assets.203 The 
corporate officers allegedly billed the company for services never rendered, paid 
unauthorized salaries and misappropriated funds from the sale of the company's 
yacht. 204 All of those transactions resulted in inaccuracies in the defendant 
company's books. The SEC agreed to settle the case with Page Airways, Inc. 
before the case could go to trial. 205 Page did not admit or deny the charges but 
agreed to a permanent injunction prohibiting further violations of the FCP A's 
accounting provisions.206 
V. THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE STUDY: EFFECTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The General Accounting Office has completed its first empirical study of the 
FCPA,207 and found dissatisfaction with the FCPA and its implementation. 208 A 
194. [d. 
195. [d. 
196. [d. 
197. [d. 
198. No. 78-0656 (D.D.C. filed Apr. II, 1978), discussed in [1978) FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1196,393. 
199. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 42. Horrock, Page Airways Group [nvestigaf£d by U.S., N.Y. Times, July 
4, 1978, at 23, col. 1. 
200. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 42. 
201. [d. 
202. [d. at 42-43. 
203. SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., No. 78-0140 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 9, 1978), discussed in [1978) 
FED. SEC. l.. REP. (CCH) ~ 96.352; Goelzer, supra note 51, at 41. 
204. Goelzer, supra note 51, at 41. 
205. [1980] SEC. REG. & l.. REP. (BNA) No. 548, at A-8 (Apr. 9, 1980). 
206. [d. 
207. [1981) SEC. REG. & 1.. REP. (BNA) No. 594, at D-I (Mar. II, 1981). The GAO completed the 
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substantial number of firms indicated that they felt the accounting costs out-
weighed the benefits of internal accounting controls, and that the anti bribery 
provisions had resulted in the loss of business overseas. 209 The GAO study 
acknowledged that implementation of the FCPA had resulted in changes in 
corporate activities,210 but stated that the antibribery provisions have also been 
criticized as being vague and ambiguous. These ambiguities have been cited as a 
possible cause of U.S. business foregoing legitimate export opportunities. Fur-
ther, companies believe they are suffering a competitive disadvantage without an 
international antibribery agreement. 211 The GAO concluded that some of the 
study in March, 1981. The GAO mailed questionnaires to 250 companies randomly selected from 
Fortune's top 1,000 companies, and used audit techniques to test the validity and accuracy of the survey 
results. /d. Commission Policy Statement on Section 30A, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,00 I, 59,004-05 (1980). 
208. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 594, at D-1 (Mar. 11, 1981). 
209. [d. Fifty-five percent of the companies completing the questionnaire believed the costs out-
weighed the benefits and 30% claimed the FCPA was responsible for the loss of business by U.S. 
companies overseas. According to half of the survey respondents, corporate compliance with the 
accounting provisions of the FCPA increased accounting and auditing costs by 11 % to 35%. [d, 
210. [d. Seventy-five percent of the respondents made changes in their internal accounting control 
and 60% have made changes in their code of conduct because of the FCPA. Excessive compliance costs 
may be the result of fear caused by the criminal penalties, The GAO, therefore, recommended 
eliminating these penalties, /d. at D-2, 
211. [d. The problem of U.S. businesses being competitively disadvantaged by the FCPA in the world 
marketplace raises the question of whether the U.S. should set the example for international ethics or 
merely comply with standards arrived at through international agreement. For a description of the 
activity regulating multinational corporations by the international community, see generally Primoff, 
sufrra note 25. There are three areas of development in the international regulation of business 
activities. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is developing model 
laws restricting business activities which injure international trade. [d. at 287-88. The UNCTAD is also 
devising a Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology. [d, at 288. The Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOq is involved with "the development and computerization of information on TNCs 
[transnational corporations]. preparation of a Code of Conduct on TNCs, and assistance to developing 
countries in decision-making on foreign investment within their borders and negotiation with TNCs." 
[d. Corrupt practices are within the purview of the U,N. Commission on Transnational Corporations. 
/d. 
There is an understandable difference in business practice goals of developed nations and lesser 
developed countries (LDCs). Developed nations tend to view the desired goal as the maintenance of free 
market economics, whereas, LDCs believe that LDCs should be exempted from the restrictions on 
prohibited business practices. [d. at 289. The opposing domestic goals of developed nations and LDCs 
significantly decrease the possibility of any international accord on restrictive business practices. [d. 
The ECOSOC established the Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Centre on Trans-
national Corporations in 1974 to provide a forum for transnational corporate issues, /d. at 301. A 
Group of Eminent Persons was convened and they developed a Code of Conduct for transnational 
corporations. Their specific recommendations do not address bribery. The Group's failure to address 
bribery probably was due to the fact that the widespread publicity concerning bribery did not occur 
until after the Group had completed its work. [d. at 314. 
In December 1975, the U,N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning bribery by multina-
tional corporations. [d, at 315. 
The U.S, Senate passed a resolution in September, 1975, asking the President to pursue, in the then 
current GATT negotiations, an international accord covering bribery. S. J. Res, 265, 94th Cong, 1st 
Sess, , 121 CONG, REc, SI6,735 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1975). 
The GAO has recommended close monitoring of efforts on the international antibribery accords, 
[1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No, 594, at E-1 (Mar. 11, 1981). 
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SEC guidance will clarify some of the ambiguities of the FCPA. 212 In addition, 
the GAO report was critical of the Justice Department's FCPA Review Proce-
dure,213 and recommended developing alternative methods of resolving am-
biguities in the antibribery provisions.214 
VI. FUTURE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
There have been recent attempts in Congress to clarify the FCPA. In Sep-
tember 1981, the Senate Banking Committee approved a version of a bill pro-
posed by Senator John Chafee. 215 The Committee did not approve all of Sen. 
Chafee's proposals.216 Instead of a financial statement "materiality" standard, as 
recommended by Senator Chafee, the Committee approved a standard for the 
accuracy of the accounting provisions to be that which a "prudent man would 
require in the management of his own affairs."217 With regard to the anti bribery 
provisions, Senator Chafee recommended eliminating the "reason to know" 
language. 218 The Committee adopted, instead, an amendment offered by 
Senator John Heinz that "defines the 'course of conduct' for which an executive 
will be accountable."219 Under this proposal an executive would be liable only if 
he intended a bribe to be made.220 The language ofthe amendment makes clear, 
however, that intent could be implied from the circumstances surrounding the 
payment. 221 Finally, the proposed bill would give the Department of Justice 
exclusive jurisdiction over the antibribery provisions.222 The SEC would retain 
civil enforcement responsibilities for the accounting provisions. 223 
212. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 594, at 0-1 (Mar. II, 1981). Former SEC Chairman 
Harold Williams has stated that, "inadvertent recordkeeping mistakes will not give rise to Commission 
enforcement proceedings; nor could a company be enjoined for falsifications of which its management, 
broadly defined, was not aware and reasonably should not have known." [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 586, at I-lOan. 14, 1981). He also stated that the Commission was changing its policy of not 
detailing what constitutes a violation of the FCPA and would, in the future, give corporations a clear 
idea of what would be considered a violation. [d. at 0-1. Chairman Williams's statements have been 
incorporated into SEC policy and all commissioners concur with those views. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 591, at 0-7 (Feb. 18, 1981). 
213. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 594, at 0-2 (Mar. 11, 1981). The report states that the 
procedure "has yet to effectively address the ambiguities in the antibribery provisions and it is doubtful 
that it will." [d. Part of the criticism stems from the lack of SEC involvement with the procedure, despite 
the SEC's willingness to defer to the Justice Department's judgment until May 31, 1981. [d. 
214. [d. 
215. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 621, at 0-1 (Sept. 23,1981). 
216. [d. 
217. [d. 
218. [d. at 0-2. 
219. [d. 
220. [d. 
221. [d. 
222. [d. 
223. !d. 
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During the hearing on the proposed amendments, former Congressman Bob 
Eckhardt defended the current FCPA.224 He stated that the FCPA should not be 
weakened and he cited figures demonstrating that U.S. exports rose after the 
FCPA was enacted.225 In contrast, Mr. Roderick Hills, a lawyer and former 
Chairman of the SEC, stated that the FCP A went too far by "criminalization of 
the issue."226 He also stated that the accountability of corporations had improved 
in the past five years and there was no longer "need for further stimulus from 
the government."227 
Despite passage of the bill in the Senate on November 23, 1981,228 the pros-
pects for any Congressional approval in 1982 are slim. There has been little 
lobbying to get the bill through the House due to the bill falling short of U.S. 
business's expectations. 229 Corporate officials feel that the proposed amend-
ments do not go far enough in resolving the FCPNs ambiguities.230 In addition, 
U.S. business was disappointed because the bill did not tie the accounting and 
antibribery provisions together.231 U.S. business wanted the accounting provi-
sions to be applicable only if illegal payments were involved. 232 The Chairman of 
the Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee, 
Congressman Timothy Wirth, is not willing to push the proposed bill in his 
subcommittee. 233 Congressman Wirth does not believe the FCPA should be 
amended unless there is solid evidence that the FCPA is hurting U.S. export 
business.234 Even if the bill is reported out of the subcommittee, it will have 
similar opposition in the House Energy & Commerce Committee. 235 Therefore, 
U.S. corporations should not anticipate even moderate legislative relief in the 
near future. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The effect of the FCP A has not been as detrimental to U.S. business interests 
as originally feared. In requesting information on the impact of the FCPA, the 
SEC received only a modicum of response. This low level of response indicates 
that corporate boardrooms are not suffering from any inability to compete due 
to the FCPA. In this regard, the predictions of the original sponsors of the FCPA 
224. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 622, at A-10 (Sept. 30, 1981). 
225. [d. 
226. [d. 
227. [d. 
228. [1981] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 630, at AA-1 (Nov. 25, 1981). 
229. [1982] SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No.1, at 27 Gan. 26,1982). 
230. [d. 
231. [d. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. 
234. [d. 
235. /d. 
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may be correct. Those sponsors contended that a strong antibribery bill would 
enhance U.S. business interests by creating an image of integrity and forthright-
ness, putting the world on notice that American goods and technology were of 
such quality that companies could market those goods without resorting to bribes 
and questionable payments. The FCPA also gave U.S. business the incentive and 
opportunity to begin refusing to pay, what had in some cases become, outra-
geous bribe demands. 
A lingering weakness of the FCPA is its unpredictability. However, the estab-
lishment of the Department of justice's FCPA Review Procedure, coupled with 
the deference which the SEC has displayed toward the procedure, should rem-
edy that shortcoming. Application of the FCP A will become more certain as the 
Department of Justice's public releases establish guidelines defining legal and 
illegal transactions. 
In applying the accounting provisions, the private sector has displayed re-
markable initiative. As a result, the SEC has withdrawn proposed rules imple-
menting the accounting provisions of the Act. Private industry should continue 
these efforts in order to avoid SEC regulation. Management should adopt at 
least the issuance of an annual report on internal accounting control and an 
examination, evaluation and report by an independent auditor of management's 
report. 
Finally, the United Nations is expected to re-examine the area of questionable 
payments to foreign officials when the international standards of business prac-
tices are finalized at the United Nations. If the major trading partners and 
industrial nations endorse the business practice proposals, the United States will 
find itself on equal competitive footing once again. U.S. business can be jus-
tifiably proud that it is on the vanguard of establishing honest and acceptable 
business practices. 
Mark Romaneski 
